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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
EVIDENCE
Dead Man's Statute-Gift Causa Mortis. By reducing the burden
of proving a gift causa mortis where the state is the only contestant,
In re McDonald's Estate' has evidently attached an exception to the
Washington "dead man's" statute. While eliminating the common
law prohibition against testimony by an "interested person," this
statute does prohibit such persons from testifying concerning "trans-
actions" with a decedent. It also prohibits testimony about "state-
ments" made by a decedent.
In re McDonald's Estate was a contest between the state, claiming
escheat, and a friend of the decedent, claiming as donee of a gift causa
mortis. At trial the alleged donee testified that he had taken bank
books from the decedent's cabin to the decedent's nursing home and
that the decedent had returned the books to him. Because of the state's
objection, based on the "dead man's" statute, the friend was not al-
lowed to testify about his transaction with the decedent at the nursing
home, and there were no other witnesses. Nevertheless, the trial court
found that the decedent had given the books to his friend with the
intention that they were to belong to him unless the donor recovered
from his illness. The state appealed, arguing insufficiency of proof.
A majority of the supreme court rejected the state's contention.
While recognizing the normal requirements for a gift causa mortis,'
they stated that the burden of proof to show such a gift is "lightened
1160 Wash. Dec. 457, 374 P2d 365 (1962).
2 RCW 5.60.030. "No person offered as a witness shall be excluded from giving
evidence by reason of his interest in the event of the action, as a party thereto or
otherwise, but such interest may be shown to affect his credibility: Provided, however,
That in an action or proceeding where the adverse party sues or defends as executor,
administrator or legal representative of any deceased person, or as deriving right or
title by, through or from any deceased person, or as the guardian or conservator of the
estate of any insane person, or of any minor under the age of fourteen years, then a
party in interest or to the record, shall not be admitted to testify in his own behalf
as to any transaction had by him with, or any statement made to him, or in his presence,
by any such deceased or insane person, or by any such minor under the age of fourteen
years: Provided further, That this exclusion shall not apply to parties of record who
sue or defend in a representative or fiduciary capacity, and have no other or further
interest in the action."
3 The court listed the requirements: "(1) the gift must be made in view of ap-
proaching death from some existing sickness or peril; (2) the donor must die from
such sickness or peril without having revoked the gift; (3) there must be a delivery,
either actual, constructive, or symbolical, of the subject of the gift to the donee or to
someone for him, with the intention of passing title thereto, subject, however, to revo-
cation in the event of recovery from the pending sickness." In re McDonald's Estate,
160 Wash. Dec. 457, 459, 374 P.2d 365, 366 (1962) ; In re White's Estate, 129 Wash.
544, 225 Pac. 415 (1924).
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somewhat"' in the absence of competing creditors or donees. For this
proposition they relied on Phinney v. State.5 There the decedent
directed his physician to write a check in favor of the donee. The
check reached the bank after the decedent's death. Since there were
no competing creditors or donees, the bank did not need protection,
and the court held that the check was a valid assignment of funds.
Because the physician was able to testify, the Phinney case clearly
did not involve the "dead man's" statute.
The majority in McDonald also relied on Wilson v. Josepkhl where
the decedent had allegedly made a gift causa mortis of jewelry to the
defendant and his wife. The decedent had made a gift of the same
jewels during a previous illness, but had taken them back when she
recovered. The "dead man's" statute prevented the defendant or his
wife from relating their conversation with the decedent. But despite
the lack of "direct evidence of what... [the decedent] said or did at
that time,"' the court found sufficient evidence to prove delivery with
intent to pass title. The similar factual pattern in Wilson thus gave
strong precedent for upholding the gift in the McDonald case.
In McDonald four judges dissented. While admitting that the de-
cedent had intended to make a gift to his friend, they found insufficient
evidence to prove that the decedent had intended a present transfer
of title.8 Rather, they argued, the evidence showed no more than an
intent to make a transfer effective upon death. In support of this
conclusion, they relied not only on the absence of direct evidence, but
also on the fact that the friend had filed escheat forms.
When a divided court must make a factual decision while hampered
by lack of evidence, it becomes important to inquire into the policy
behind the "dead man's" statute. One of the earliest theories in sup-
port of the statute regarded the right to testify as a mutual privilege:
"Death having closed the lips of one party, the law closes the lips of
the other."9 This statement is in reality a gloss for the legislative
feeling that survivors will take advantage of the court and will use
-'In re McDonald's Estate, supra note 3, at 460, 374 P2d at 367.
G 36 Wash. 236, 78 Pac. 927 (1904).
6 101 Wash. 614, 172 Pac. 745 (1918).
7Id. at 616, 172 Pac. at 746.
8 Judge Hill quoted Newsome v. Allen, 86 Wash. 678, 151 Pac. 111 (1915), quoting
the rule from Jackson v. Lamar, 67 Wash. 385, 388, 121 Pac. 857, 859 (1912) : "The
donor must not only signify his purpose to give, but he must deliver, and as the law
does not presume that an owner has voluntarily parted with his property, he who
asserts title by gift must prove it by evidence that is clear and convincing, strong and
satisfactory."
9 In re Cunningham's Estate, 94 Wash. 181, 183, 161 Pac. 1193 (1917). See 2
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 578 (3d ed. 1940).
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perjury to pilfer the defenseless estate of the decedent. Scholars have
been nearly unanimous in attacking this theory. They believe that
legislatures have underestimated the ability of the courts and juries
to detect false testimony on the part of estate "bounty hunters."
Support for the "dead man's" statute arises also from the fact that
decedents cannot contradict the testimony of survivors." This argu-
ment does not suppose either inability of courts to discover false testi-
mony nor the dishonesty of survivors. Rather, it rests on the common
experience that honest people derive conflicting impressions from a
single event. Thus it is felt that there may be injustice if only half of
the "honest" testimony is heard by the court. This argument has been
met somewhat in those states following the Connecticut scheme, where
statements of the decedent are admissable to contradict the testimony
of survivors. Aside from this imperfect device, there is no way to over-
come the "contradiction" argument.
A consideration often overlooked is the practical effect of the "dead
man's" statute on the everyday administration of estates by the ad-
ministrator or executor. These statutes give the administrator a
strong advantage in dealing with claims that may not be easily sus-
ceptible of proof or disproof. He can simply deny the claim and force
the claimant to produce satisfactory evidence. While this procedure
has undoubtedly destroyed many valid claims, it has, in all proba-
bility, also defeated many spurious claims.
Several states have taken significant steps to retain protection of
the decedent's estate and at the same time allow the testimony of in-
terested persons. The most widespread scheme is Connecticut's.' 2 It
allows a living person to testify concerning any transaction with the
deceased; but, to satisfy the "contradiction" argument, 3 it also allows
the representative of the decedent to admit all self-serving statements
by the deceased which tend to contradict the testimony of the living.
This is clearly an added exception to the hearsay rule. Normally
10 Ladd, The Dead Man Statute: Some Further Observations and a Legislative
Proposal, 26 IowA L. REV. 207 (1941); MORGAN, EVIDENCE 24 (1927) ; WIGmoRE,
op. cit. supra note 9, at 696.
11 Lee, The Dead Mai; Statute and the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 11 MIANIs L.Q.
103 (1956).
12 "No person shall be disqualfied as a witness in any action by reason of his interest
in the event of the same as a party or otherwise . . . but such interest or conviction
may be shown for the purpose of affecting his credit." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-145 (1958). "In actions by or against the representatives of deceased persons
. the entries, memoranda and declarations of the deceased, relevant to the matter
in issue, may be received as evidence." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-172 (1958).
13 Lee, supra note I I
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courts admit only those statements of deceased persons which are
strictly against interest. 4
Under the present Washington scheme, the donee of a gift causa
mortis cannot offer his own testimony showing delivery by the donor
with the appropriate words of intent. But the donee can offer declara-
tions of the donor made to other persons wherein the donor stated that
he had made a gift, since these are declarations against interest.15 The
donor's representative finds himself barred from offering evidence of
statements by the deceased that he did not make a gift, since these are
self-serving declarations and hence inadmissable.1 Thus, in Wash-
ington a living person has the advantage once he can produce a dis-
interested witness. The Connecticut system allows the donee to give
full details of the gift and all statements made by all parties. At the
same time, the representative of the deceased may introduce all self-
serving statements that are relevant. If In re McDonald had been
heard under the Connecticut plan, the court would have had before it
all relevant evidence to aid its decision. Thus, there would have been
no need for the "escheat" exception created by this case.
Five states have followed the lead of Connecticut." This approach
has been recommended by the Commonwealth Trust Fund of New
York 8 and the American Bar Association. 9 The Model Code of Evi-
14 5 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1457 (3d ed. 1940).
15 Colby v. Nelson, 13 Wash. 650, 230 Pac. 629 (1924). Accord, In re Krause's
Estate v. Miller, 173 Wash. 1, 21 P.2d 268 (1933) (contract to make a will) ; Corbett
v. Weaver, 59 Wash. 248, 109 Pac. 803 (1910) (action for services rendered). See
Annot., Admissibility of Declarations by Donor Subsequot to Alleged Gift, on Issue
as to Gift, 105 A.L.R. 398 (1936).
10 Annot., supra note 15, at 403. Accord, Carey v. Powell, 32 Wn2d 761, 204 P.2d
193 (1949) (contract to make a will) ; Doernbecher v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 16 Wn2d
64, 132 P.2d 751 (1943) (cancellation or rescission) ; Eastman, Inc. v. Northwestern
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 Wash. 125, 13 P.2d 488 (1932) ; Levy v. Simon, 119 Wash.
179, 205 Pac. 426 (1922) (accounting) ; Reese v. Murnan, 5 Wash. 373, 31 Pac. 1027
(1892) (sale of land). Recent decisions required that the statement must have been
made with the belief that it was against the declarant's pecuniary interest, or would be
against his interest in the future. It re Allen's Estate, 54 Wn.2d 617, 343 P.2d 867
(1959); National Bank of Commerce v. Lutheran Brotherhood, 40 Wn.2d 790, 246
P.2d 843 (1952) ; Allen v. Dillard, 15 Wn.2d 35, 129 P.2d 813 (1942).
1 7 ALASKA Com. LAws ANN. § 58-5-1 (1948) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 516:22,
516:25 (1955); ANN. LAWS OF MASS. ch. 233 §§ 20, 65 (1956); RI. GEN. LAws
§§ 9-17-12, 9-19-11 (1956) ; S.D. CODE §§ 36.0101, 36.0104 (1939). Louisiana appears
to have a similar plan; at least the state does not forbid the survivor to testify.
LA. CIVIL CODE § 2282 (1952).
18 This fund established a committee to study prollems in evidence. Professors
Morgan, Chafee, Gifford, Hinton, Sunderland, and Wigmore, Hon. Charles M. Hough,
Judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Hon. William A. John-
ston, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Kansas, were members. After polling
the attorneys of Connecticut, the committee recommended the following model statute:
"No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any action, suit or proceeding
by reason of his interest in the event of the same as a party or otherwise.
"In actions, suits or proceedings by or against the representatives of deceased
19631
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dence0 and the Uniform Rules of Evidence2 contain provisions simi-
lar to the Connecticut rule. In addition to the Connecticut approach
there are the "discretionary" and "corroboration" schemes. Arizona
and Montana 22 follow the "discretionary" scheme whereby the trial
court has discretion to admit testimony from survivors. Five jurisdic-
tions" allow the survivor to testify so long as he has corroboration.
This device is very similar to the Washington scheme, except that
under the "corroboration" rule, once the survivor has a witness, then
the survivor himself can also testify.
While the decision in In re McDonald probably resulted in justice,
it is unfortunate that the court had to involve itself in a process of
guess-work and loop-hole hunting.' The decades of successful prac-
tice under the Connecticut system indicate a practical solution to the
"dead man's" statute that combines both justice and the necessary
free supply of evidence.
KENNETH L. SCHUBERT, JR.
persons, including proceedings for the probate of wills, any statement of the deceased,
whether oral or written, shall not be excluded as hearsay provided that the trial
judge shall first find as a fact that the statement was made by decedent, and that it
was made in good faith and on decedent's personal knowledge." MORGAN, EVIDENCE
35 (1927).
19 63 ABA REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 582 (1938).
20 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, rules 9 & 503 (1942).
21 UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 7 & 63 (4) (c).
22 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2251 (1956) ; MONT. REV. CODE §§ 93-701-2, 93-701-3
(1947).
"3 DIST. OF COLUMBIA CODE §§ 14-301, 14-302 (1961); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51,
§§ 1, 2 (1950); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-7 (1953), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-5
(Supp. 1961); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 44.010, 116.555 (1953); CODE OF VA. §§ 8-285,
8-286 (1950).
24 The common exception to the "dead man's" statute is to allow the wife to testify
as to a gift from the deceased donor to the husband. In three Washington cases the
court allowed the wife to testify, but then the court held that there was insufficient
proof of the alleged gift. In re Cunningham's Estate, 19 Wn.2d 589, 143 P.2d 852
(1943) ; Vining v. Butler, 138 Wash. 646, 244 Pac. 961 (1926) ; Showalter v. Spangle,
93 Wash. 326, 160 Pac. 1042 (1916). From these decisions it appears that the court
does not need the "dead man's" statute to protect the deceased's estate from false
or mistaken claims. If the court could weight and reject the wife's testimony, why is
the court unable to weigh and test the testimony of the donee-husband?
Other exceptions have been created by the courts. In Nott v. McDonald, 146
Wash. 638, 264 Pac. 1003 (1928) parents were allowed to testify that the decendent
delivered a deed to their daughter as they were not "parties in interest." In another
situation, the husband and son could testify that they made a gift of property to the
wife-mother. Since this testimony protected her estate from community property
creditors, it was allowed. In re Cunningham's Estate, 94 Wash. 191, 161 Pac. 1193
(1917). And in Bardsley v. Truax, 64 Wash. 400, 116 Pac. 1075 (1911) the grantee
was allowed to state that he had possession of a deed from the grantor immediately
after the date of the deed as this was not testimony of a "transaction" with the de-
ceased, nor a "statement" made by the deceased.
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